Digital Commons at St. Mary's University
First Year Best Briefs

School of Law Student Scholarship

Spring 2014

Logan A. Wheeler, Best of Section B
Logan A. Wheeler

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/bestbriefs

Recommended Citation
Wheeler, Logan A., "Logan A. Wheeler, Best of Section B" (2014). First Year Best Briefs. 15.
https://commons.stmarytx.edu/bestbriefs/15

This Brief, Section B is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law Student Scholarship at Digital
Commons at St. Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in First Year Best Briefs by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information, please contact
sfowler@stmarytx.edu, jcrane3@stmarytx.edu.

No. 12-696a

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
MARTIN COUNTY AND MARTIN COUNTY BOARD,
Petitioners,
v.
ANNE DHALIWAL,
Respondent.

On Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Seventeenth Circuit

BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS

LOGAN A. WHEELER
Counsel of Record
Wheeler Law, P.C.
One Camino Santa Maria
San Antonio, Texas 78228
Telephone: (210) 123-4567
Email: lwheeler@lawwheeler.com
Counsel for Petitioners

QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.

Did the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventeenth Circuit apply the correct legal
standard?

II.

Does the Martin County legislative prayer practice violate the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment?
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BRIEF FOR PETITIONER

OPINIONS BELOW
The Opinion and Order of the Seventeenth Circuit (R. at 32) is unreported. The United
States District Court for the Northern District of West Carolina’s Opinion and Order Granting
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (R. at 27) is unreported.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The court of appeals entered judgment on February 1, 2013. (R. at 32.) Petitioner filed
his petition for writ of certiorari on February 7, 2013. (R. at 35.) This Court granted the petition
on May 20, 2013. (R. at 37.) This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (2006).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court’s fact findings and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them are
reviewed for clear error. Its legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion….
U.S. CONST. amend. I.

v

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Since 1985, Martin County Board has maintained a practice of opening its public
meetings with a legislative prayer. (R. at 27.) The purpose of the practice is to bring together
members of the community before lawmaking commences. (R. at 20.) The Board’s practice is
similar to that of Congress and many other legislative bodies throughout the country, which also
begin public sessions with an invocation. (R. at 18.)
The prayer leaders selected to give invocations at Martin County Board meetings are
volunteers from established religious congregations within Martin County. (R. at 27-28.) Martin
County has approximately 283 established religious congregations, most of which are Christian.
(R. at 28.) Of these congregations, approximately 185 that have either participated in the prayer
opportunity in the past or expressed an interest in doing so appear on a list maintained by the
Board and its volunteers. (R. at 27-28.) The list is organized alphabetically, and each month a
volunteer sends letters signed by the chairman to invite congregations next on the list to
participate in an upcoming invocation. (R. at 10.) A leader from any congregation located
within Martin County is welcome to volunteer to lead the prayer. (R. at 10.) The Board does not
regulate or contribute to the prayers’ content, and the only instruction given to potential prayer
leaders is that their prayers be kept under five minutes. (R. at 28.) The prayers are not
incorporated into the Board’s meeting minutes but are captured in video and audio recordings
that are archived online. (R. at 12.)
In April 2011, Anne Dhaliwal and her family moved to Martin County and began
regularly attending Martin County Board meetings. (R. at 27.) The Dhaliwals are adherents of
the Sikh religion, which does not preach a gospel or have a priest or leader. (R. at 7.) At the
September 11, 2011, meeting, Anne Dhaliwal’s husband, Manpreet Dhaliwal, addressed
members of the Board, saying the practice of beginning each meeting with a prayer is “nice,” but
1

the policy should be changed to “completely forbid” specific religious references, like those to
Jesus Christ. (R. at 7.) Then-Chairman Benjamin Gates told Manpreet Dhaliwal the Board
would consider his request.
On October 20, 2011, Anne Dhaliwal sent a letter to Benjamin Gates, asking that he meet
with the Dhaliwal family to discuss the Board’s prayer practice. (R. at 9.) Anne Dhaliwal wrote
that she and her family were offended by the imposition of certain religions in the invocations
and charged that the Board’s practice constituted a violation of her family’s First Amendment
rights. (R. at 9.) Benjamin Gates did not respond to Anne Dhaliwal’s letter because of the
Board’s policy of not responding to community concerns unless those concerns are brought up
during a Board meeting. (R. at 16.) The Board maintains its response policy in an effort to
uphold equality and fairness and to promote transparency and inclusiveness in its political
processes. (R. at 16.)
On November 25, 2011, Anne Dhaliwal filed a complaint against Martin County and the
Martin County Board in the United States District Court for the Northern District of West
Carolina requesting a declaratory judgment that the Board’s sponsorship of sectarian prayers
violates the Constitution. (R. at 11-15.) Anne Dhaliwal also sought an injunction enjoining the
Board from knowingly allowing sectarian prayers at board meetings and requiring the Board to
advise its prayer givers that sectarian prayer is not permitted. (R. at 14-15.) The County and
County Board filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that Anne Dhaliwal failed to state an
Establishment Clause violation for which relief could be granted. (R. at 18-22.) The district
court granted Martin County and Martin County Board’s motion to dismiss. (R. at 27-29.) Anne
Dhaliwal appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventeenth Circuit reversed
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the judgment of the district court. (R. at 32-34.) On May 20, 2013, this Court granted Martin
County and Martin County Board’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari. (R. at 37-38.)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

In the seminal legislative prayer case of Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983),

this Court recognized legislative prayer as a time-honored tradition that does not violate the First
Amendment’s Establishment Clause unless the prayer practice is used to proselytize or advance
one religion over another. The Marsh standard proscribing legislative prayers that proselytize or
advance a religion has been interpreted differently throughout the circuits, creating a circuit split.
The Ninth Circuit has adopted a facially neutral affiliation standard that requires a court
to determine whether a legislative body has actively taken steps to affiliate itself with one
religion. Actively affiliating itself with a religion would make the legislative body’s prayer
practice unconstitutional. This standard allows for diversity among communities across the
nation to flourish because a court does not have to declare a practice unconstitutional solely
because of a prevalence of one religion’s prayers, which may result from a community’s
demographics and not any impermissible legislative bias. It also provides courts with an
objective standard that can be applied consistently throughout the circuits in future legislative
prayer cases. The Second Circuit has taken a totality of the circumstances approach, which
requires a court to view a prayer practice as a whole from the standpoint of a reasonable observer
to determine whether or not the practice advances one religion over others. This standard is
subjective and may lead to inconsistent results throughout the circuits. The Fourth Circuit’s
frequency test calls for a court to review the frequency with which sectarian references are made
to determine the constitutionality of a particular legislative prayer practice. Use of this test,
however, will often directly conflict with Marsh’s proscription of parsing the language of
3

legislative prayers because it requires a court to review the language of legislative prayers even
when the prayer practice employed has not been deemed to proselytize or advance one religion
over another.
The facially neutral affiliation standard employed by the Ninth Circuit guards against the
issues raised by both the totality of the circumstances test and the frequency test, and its
endorsement and application by this Court would provide much-needed clarity to legislative
bodies interested in creating or continuing legislative prayer practices consistent with the
Establishment Clause.
II.

The prayer practice employed by the Martin County Board does not violate the

Establishment Clause because the Board does not use the practice to proselytize or advance any
one religion over another. The Board implemented a policy open to any and all established
religious congregations within Martin County. The Board also proactively updated the list of
local congregations it maintained to ensure its invitation process did not exclude a congregation
interested in offering an invocation. It treated volunteer clergy members equally by only
instructing them to limit their prayers to five minutes. No additional restrictions were placed on
any volunteer. Furthermore, the Board did not include the content of the offered prayers in its
official minutes. Excluding the prayers from the Board’s official minutes is one example of how
the Board has actively avoided any unconstitutional endorsement or affiliation with any of the
prayer leaders’ religious beliefs.
Through its neutral policy, the Martin County Board purposefully avoided affiliating
itself with any religion. A reasonable observer viewing the practice in context would not find
that the Board’s actions rose to the impermissible standard of proselytizing or advancing one
religion over others. Because the Board’s actions did not meet this threshold set out in Marsh,
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no inquiry into the frequency of sectarian references in the prayers should be made. Thus,
Martin County Board’s legislative prayer practice withstands constitutional scrutiny under the
guidelines set forth by this Court, and the Board did not violate Anne Dhaliwal’s First
Amendment rights under whichever available legal standard this Court adopts.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTEENTH CIRCUIT
ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S TOTALITY OF THE
CIRCUMSTANCES TEST
A.

Legislative prayer is a well-established, constitutionally-valid tradition
deserving of protection.

The legitimacy of legislative prayer has been acknowledged by this Court on several
occasions. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792; Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S.
573, 602 (1989); Joyner v. Forsyth Cnty., 653 F.3d 341, 346 (4th Cir. 2011). This Court’s
explicit recognition of legislative prayers as part of the very fabric of American society further
illustrates the importance this Court has placed on maintaining legislative prayer practices. See
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 792. Enjoying a unique status in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the
constitutionality of legislative prayer is recognized as a sui generis legal question. Snyder v.
Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 1231 (10th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
To this day, Marsh v. Chambers stands as the seminal case on legislative prayer and must
be considered in any analysis regarding the constitutionality of a legislative body’s prayer
practice. In Marsh, this Court examined a state legislature’s practice of opening each of its
sessions with a prayer led by a chaplain paid from public funds. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 784. It
concluded that legislative prayer practices that neither proselytize nor advance one faith over
another do not violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 795-96. In its review of the legislature’s
5

practice, this Court emphasized the longstanding tradition of American legislatures opening
meetings with invocational prayers. Id. at 786-90. That tradition began in the First Congress,
which was made up of many of the country’s Founding Fathers and the very draftsmen of the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Id. at 787-88. Recognizing that members of the First
Congress voted in favor of appointing a paid congressional chaplain during the same week they
voted to approve the daft of the First Amendment, this Court aptly concluded that those members
of the First Congress could not be understood as interpreting or intending the Establishment
Clause to prohibit legislative prayer. Id. at 790. As evidenced by the unbroken history of the
practice in federal, state and local legislatures for more than 200 years, a consensus has long
existed as to the constitutionality of legislative prayer. Id. at 792. According to this Court, such
long-standing traditions should be protected and preserved, not lightly cast aside. See Walz v.
Tax Comm’n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 678 (1970).
This Court demonstrated such protection of a long-standing tradition in Marsh when it
declined to apply, as the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit had, the strict three-part test of
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), to determine the constitutionality of the Nebraska
Legislature’s prayer practice. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786. The three elements of the Lemon test,
which was the prevailing standard applied to Establishment Clause cases at the time, required the
government’s actions (1) maintain a secular legislative purpose, (2) have a principal or primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) avoid fostering excessive government
entanglement with religion. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. Under the Lemon test, the Nebraska
Legislature’s prayer practice in Marsh would have clearly been unconstitutional. By relaxing the
standard applicable to legislative prayer cases in its seminal case on the issue, this Court
indicated its view of the importance of protecting and preserving legislative prayer practices. A
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new and more broadly-drawn line for legislative prayer cases was established in Marsh so that
all legislative prayer practices that stop short of either proselytizing or advancing one religion at
the expense of others may be upheld under the Establishment Clause. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at
795-96.
B.

Application of the affiliation standard better conforms to the broad standard
set forth by this Court in Marsh.

The proscription against proselytizing or advancing one religion over another is broad for
the purpose of allowing various legislative prayer practices around the county to withstand
constitutional scrutiny. The correct legal standard to apply in legislative prayer cases is that
which most closely adheres to the broad guidelines set forth by this Court in Marsh.
The Ninth Circuit has read Marsh as requiring an inquiry into whether the government
has either deliberately or through implication placed its imprimatur on a particular faith or
religion. Rubin v. City of Lancaster, 710 F.3d 1087, 1095-96 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 2013
WL 3789507 (Oct. 7, 2013) (quoting Joyner, 653 F.3d at 362 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting)). In
Rubin, the Ninth Circuit examined the acts of a city council to determine if the council had
proactively taken steps to affiliate with one religion over others, applying what may
appropriately be called the affiliation standard. Id. at 1097. Under the affiliation standard, a
legislative body that, through its prayer practice, has taken steps to affiliate itself with a certain
religion has crossed the line and begun to advance that religion over others, violating the
Establishment Clause. Id. The affiliation to any religious organization or doctrine standard used
by the Ninth Circuit was previously established by this Court. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 590.
Unlike other standards employed by the circuits, the affiliation standard places the crux
of a court’s consideration of a prayer practice’s constitutionality on the actions and intent of the
legislative body under review. This not only encourages legislatures that would fall under such a
7

standard of review to carefully craft a neutral policy, but it also provides for an objective
consideration of a prayer practice that can more easily be applied uniformly to future legislative
prayer cases.
In Rubin, the Ninth Circuit upheld the city council’s prayer practice even though most
prayers were Christian because the council had developed a prayer policy that was carefully
crafted to ensure its own evenhandedness and avoid violating the Establishment Clause. Rubin,
710 F.3d at 1097. The council had taken steps to be inclusive, and the fact that most prayers
were Christian was merely a reflection of the city’s demographics and a function of the religious
leaders who chose to respond to the city’s invitations. Id. at 1098.
This country has long appreciated the highly-regarded principle of protecting diversity.
Indeed, a primary aim of the First Amendment is to protect diversity of ideas and opinions
generally and of religious beliefs specifically. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. When such a benign
factor as local demographics is the primary reason for a majority of the prayers representing one
religion, it would go against reason and this Court’s precedent to indiscriminately toss out the
entire prayer practice. See Joyner, 653 F.3d at 363 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting).
The clear directive of Marsh is that the government may not proselytize or advance one
religion over others. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795-96. Where a legislature has not crossed this line in
its prayer practice, it has not violated the Establishment Clause. See id. The affiliation standard
employed by the Ninth Circuit closely adheres to the legislative prayer guidelines established in
and required by Marsh without arbitrarily adding considerations that would narrow the scope of
the standard this Court outlined.
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C.

The Second Circuit’s totality of the circumstances test requires
impermissible parsing of the language of legislative prayers and undermines
the efforts of legislatures that actively maintain neutral policies.

Every legislative prayer practice must fall within the bounds set by Marsh, which remains
a fixed point within this Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at
786; Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 28 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2388
(May 20, 2013). In their efforts to define those bounds, some circuits have adopted standards
that arbitrarily narrow the scope of constitutionality outlined in Marsh. The Second Circuit’s
totality of circumstances test provides an example.
In Galloway v. Town of Greece, the Second Circuit faced a case of first impression on the
constitutionality of a particular legislative prayer practice. Id. at 26. It adopted a totality of the
circumstances test to determine the constitutionality of the Town of Greece’s prayer policy. Id.
at 29. That test required the court to decide whether the town’s practice, viewed in its totality
from the standpoint of an ordinary, reasonable observer, conveyed the view that the town favored
or disfavored certain religious beliefs. Id. In so doing, the court reviewed the selection process
of the prayer-givers, the content of the prayers and the actions and inactions of town officials and
invited prayer givers to hold the town’s prayer practice unconstitutional. Id. at 30.
One of the elements the court examined was the sectarian nature of some of the prayers.
See id. at 31. Notably, the court acknowledged that major problems arise when an emphasis is
placed on an examination of the prayers’ sectarian or nonsectarian nature. Id. at 28. The court
correctly recognized that this Court has explicitly ruled that a government may not establish an
official or civic religion in an effort to avoid an Establishment Clause violation. Id. at 29
(quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992)). Prohibiting prayer givers from mentioning
any sectarian figures would tend to make a prayer civic, and not religious, in nature, and the
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Establishment Clause does not prohibit governmental bodies from participating in actions that
harmonize with religious canons. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 462 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). However, establishing a vague theistic or civic religion is itself a violation of the
Establishment Clause. Lee, 505 U.S. at 590.
Requiring legislative prayers to not include any sectarian references is not required by
either Marsh or Allegheny. Rubin, 710 F.3d at 1094. This makes practical sense. A Christian
prayer will necessarily reference God and Jesus, just as a Muslim prayer will likely reference
Allah. Requiring clergy members from these and other faiths to remove such references would
strip away any meaning and purpose of their prayers.
Requiring legislative prayer leaders to make no sectarian references is too strict a
requirement and one that goes beyond the standards required by this Court in Marsh.
Furthermore, a focus on the content of legislative prayers necessarily violates the proscription in
Marsh that if the prayer opportunity is not being used to proselytize or advance one religion over
another, the court is not to evaluate or parse the content of particular prayers. Marsh, 463 U.S. at
795. This proscription has been reaffirmed as making “perfect sense” in more recent cases, as it
would place the court in a role it cannot and should not serve. See Joyner, 653 F.3d at 351;
Rubin, 710 F.3d at 1100.
The totality of the circumstances test is also problematic because of its emphasis on the
effect of the policy without equal consideration given to the efforts to maintain neutrality in the
policy. Legislatures can exercise abundant control over the neutrality of their prayer policies.
They cannot, however, exercise such control over the religious backgrounds of the individuals
who choose to accept their invitations to participate in prayer opportunities. It should not be
forgotten that when a legislative body utilizes a neutral policy that is proactively inclusive, the
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prayers will naturally reflect the religions of the prayer leaders and not the preferences of the
legislative body. Joyner, 653 F.3d at 363 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). To punish legislatures by
banning their prayer practices for something so out of their control as the community’s
demographics would be to ban legitimate prayer practices where such a ban is not warranted by
this Court. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794.
Furthermore, the totality of the circumstances test is highly subjective and thus more
malleable and more likely to be applied differently throughout the nation’s courts. The result
would be uncertainty for legislative bodies that are interested in maintaining constitutionally
sound prayer practices, which this Court has recognized is a legitimate right of American
governmental bodies. Id. at 792; Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 602; Joyner, 653 F.3d at 346.
D.

The Fourth Circuit’s frequency test demands impermissible parsing of the
language of legislative prayers and narrows the scope of what constitutes a
valid legislative prayer practice under Marsh.

The Fourth Circuit, like the Second Circuit, has also adopted a test that narrows the
bounds of Marsh. On multiple occasions, the Fourth Circuit has used a frequency test related to
references of sectarian figures in legislative prayers to hold certain legislative prayer practices
unconstitutional. Joyner, 653 F.3d at 352; Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292, 298-99
(4th Cir. 2004). Both in Joyner v. Forsyth County and in Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, the
court held the respective prayer policies unconstitutional largely because of the frequent
references to Christian figures. Joyner, 653 F.3d at 352; Wynne, 376 F.3d at 298-99.
In Joyner, the court went a step further and said Forsyth County should have proactively
discouraged references to sectarian figures in its legislative prayers. Joyner, 653 F.3d at 353.
However, proactively discouraging references to sectarian figures is a much more restrictive
standard than that ever imposed on legislative prayer practices by this Court. See Marsh, 463
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U.S. at 794-95. To the contrary, this Court has stated that the government should ordinarily not
have any role in determining the content of public prayers. Lee, 505 U.S. at 588.
The Fourth Circuit has interpreted the Establishment Clause as requiring legislative
prayers to embrace a non-sectarian ideal. Joyner, 653 F.3d at 347. See Simpson v. Chesterfield
Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 278 (4th Cir. 2005). It has explicitly stated that it only
approves legislative prayer when it is nonsectarian in both policy and practice. Id. at 348.
However, this Court has never held that such a narrow scope is required for legislative prayer
practices to be constitutional. Indeed, this Court held that even the nonsectarian prayer at issue
in Lee v. Weisman violated the Establishment Clause. Lee, 505 U.S. at 581. Reviewing Marsh
as informed by Lee and Allegheny, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the major cases decided
by this Court that inform legislative prayer jurisprudence do not direct courts to inquire into the
content of prayers unless and until the prayer opportunity has been exploited to advance a
particular religious belief. Pelphrey v. Cobb Cnty., 547 F.3d 1263, 1271 (11th Cir. 2008).
Although this Court considered the nonsectarian nature of the chaplain’s prayers in Marsh, the
nonsectarian nature of the prayers did not form the basis for any bright-line rule. Id. The Fourth
Circuit, having implemented such a narrow standard, seems to be creating its own limitations on
legislative prayer policies, and these limitations go far beyond the requirements established by
this Court.
The most appropriate policy a legislative body can take to avoid proselytizing or
advancing one religion over others is to accept and welcome any volunteer from an established,
local congregation and to consistently provide them with the same instructions.

12

II.

MARTIN COUNTY BOARD’S LEGISLATIVE PRAYER PRACTICE DOES NOT
VIOLATE THE FIRST AMENDMENT ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
A.

Under the affiliation standard, Martin County Board’s legislative prayer
practice is constitutional.

In Rubin, the city council did not require attendees to participate in the prayers, the prayer
leaders were not paid for their invocations, members of the council did not preview or involve
themselves in the content of the prayers and the prayer givers were invited off of a list that
included congregations of numerous denominations within the city’s limits. Rubin, 710 F.3d at
1097-98. Martin County Board’s prayer practice is nearly identical to the city council practice
upheld in Rubin under the affiliation standard.
The Board proactively pursued an inclusive and neutral policy that was open to members
of any local congregation. The list it maintained and used throughout its invitation process was
consistently updated so as not to exclude parties who may have been interested in offering a
prayer at an upcoming meeting. The same list was organized alphabetically and congregations
were not grouped off according to their denominations. Furthermore, the Board purposefully
avoided setting up strict guidelines for the prayers, specifically regarding the prayers’ content.
Other than to limit their allotted time to give the prayer to five minutes, the Board in no way
attempted to control the actions or words of the prayer. This hands-off approach tends to show
that the words of the prayer leaders were their own and were not being used by the Board to
proselytize or advance any one religion. The Board also excluded the prayer content from its
official meeting minutes, further illustrating an attempt to avoid unconstitutional affiliation with
a religion.
According to Anne Dhaliwal, the frequency of Christian prayers at the Board’s meetings
was offensive. However, Anne Dhaliwal has shown no evidence to support a finding that the
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frequency of Christian prayers resulted from an unconstitutional act by the Board and not merely
a result of Martin County’s demographics. Unless Anne Dhaliwal can show the Board engaged
in purposeful discrimination, her point is moot. See Pelphrey, 547 F.3d at 1281.
Under the affiliation standard, Martin County Board’s efforts to maintain a neutral prayer
policy tend to show no attempted affiliation with Christianity over other religions, faiths or
beliefs, thus the Board’s policy should be deemed valid under the Establishment Clause.
B.

Martin County Board’s legislative prayer policy also withstands
constitutional scrutiny under either the totality of the circumstances test or
the frequency test.

If this Court adopts the totality of the circumstances test, an element of Martin County
Board’s prayer policy that merits consideration is the Board’s purpose behind the practice.
According to the Board, it has maintained its practice to bring together members of the
community prior to engaging in important lawmaking efforts. This Court has recognized the
legitimacy of using legislative prayer to solemnize the task of governance. McGowan, 366 U.S.
at 442. Other considerations under the totality of the circumstances test will include a review of
the invitation process, the content of the prayers and the actions of the board members and prayer
leaders. When observing these elements of the Board’s prayer practice all together, a reasonable
observer would not conclude that the Board attempted to proselytize or advance any one religion
over others. The Board opened the prayer opportunities up to a variety of religious
denominations and treated the volunteers equally at the meetings. It also did not make the
prayers a part of its official business of government by excluding the prayers from official Board
meeting minutes.
If this Court deems the frequency test as the appropriate legal standard, it is important to
note that the Court’s own precedent will prohibit a parsing of the legislative prayer language for
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sectarian references unless and until it has established that Martin County Board’s practice
proselytized or advanced one religion over others. In the instant case, Martin County Board did
not cross this threshold under any of the available legal standards. Utilizing the frequency
standard to parse the content of the prayers given is, therefore, not appropriate. Marsh, 463 U.S.
at 794-95.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioners Martin County and Martin County Board request
this Court reverse the judgment of the Seventeenth Circuit Court of Appeals and render judgment
in favor of Petitioners Martin County and Martin County Board.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Logan A. Wheeler
LOGAN A. WHEELER
Counsel of Record
Wheeler Law, P.C.
One Camino Santa Maria
San Antonio, Texas 78228
Telephone: (210) 123-4567
Email: lwheeler@lawwheeler.com
Counsel for Petitioners
March 7, 2014
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